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On the Power of Quantum Memory
Robert Ko¨nig, Ueli Maurer, Fellow, IEEE, and Renato Renner
Abstract— We address the question whether quantum memory
is more powerful than classical memory. In particular, we
consider a setting where information about a random n-bit string
X is stored in s classical or quantum bits, for s < n, i.e., the
stored information is bound to be only partial. Later, a randomly
chosen predicate F about X has to be guessed using only
the stored information. The maximum probability of correctly
guessing F (X) is then compared for the cases where the storage
device is classical or quantum mechanical, respectively. We show
that, despite the fact that the measurement of quantum bits can
depend arbitrarily on the predicate F , the quantum advantage
is negligible already for small values of the difference n− s. Our
setting generalizes the setting of Ambainis et al. who considered
the problem of guessing an arbitrary bit (i.e., one of the n bits)
of X.
An implication for cryptography is that privacy amplification
by universal hashing remains essentially equally secure when
the adversary’s memory is allowed to be quantum rather than
only classical. Since privacy amplification is a main ingredient
of many quantum key distribution (QKD) protocols, our result
can be used to prove the security of QKD in a generic way.
Index Terms— Cryptography, privacy amplification, quantum
information theory, quantum key distribution, quantum memory,
security proofs, universal hashing.
I. INTRODUCTION
It is a well-known fact that in s quantum bits one cannot
reliably store more than s classical bits of information.1 In
other words, the raw storage capacity (like the raw trans-
mission capacity) of a quantum bit is just one bit of infor-
mation. However, since quantum memory can be read by an
arbitrary measurement determined only at the time of reading
the memory, quantum memory can be expected to be more
powerful than classical memory in any context where a string
X of n > s bits of information is given (and hence can be
stored only partially) and it is determined only later which
information about X is of interest.2
The simplest setting one can consider is that one must
use the stored information to guess F (X) for a randomly
chosen predicate F : X → {0, 1}. Ambainis, Nayak, Ta-
Shma, and Vazirani [4], [5] were the first to study such
a setting for the special case where X is an n-bit string
and F (X) is an actual bit (i.e., one of the n bits) of X .
Because in the quantum case one can let the measurement
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1This is a direct consequence of the Holevo bound [1] stating that the
accessible information contained in a quantum state cannot be larger than its
von Neumann entropy. This assertion is also a consequence of the general
results proven in this paper (cf. Section IV-C).
2A typical example of such a setting is the bounded-storage model [2], [3].
of the stored quantum bits depend arbitrarily on F , while in
the classical case one can only read the stored information,
quantum memory is potentially more powerful. However, we
prove that having information about X stored in s quantum
instead of s classical bits is essentially useless for guessing
F (X), even for optimal quantum storage and measurement
strategies. This is in accordance with the results in [4], [5]
as well as with recent results on communication complexity
(see e.g., [6]) where the power of classical and quantum
communication is compared.
In a cryptographic context, our results can be applied to
the security analysis of cryptographic primitives in a context
where an adversary might hold quantum information. An
important example is privacy amplification introduced by
Bennett, Brassard, and Robert [7] (see also [8]) which is a
protocol between two parties, Alice and Bob. The goal is to
turn a common n-bit string X , about which an adversary Eve
has some partial information, into a highly secure k-bit key
K . This can be achieved as follows: Alice and Bob publicly
agree on a function G : {0, 1}n → {0, 1}k chosen from
a two-universal class of hash functions3 and then compute
K = G(X).4 It has been shown that, if Eve’s information
about X consists of no more than s classical bits, the final
key is secure as long as k < n− s.5
Similar to the previously described setting, it seems to
be a potential advantage for the adversary to have available
s quantum instead of s classical bits of information about
X because she later learns the function G and can let her
measurement of the s quantum bits depend on G. This may
allow her to obtain more information about the final key K .
We prove that this is not the case, i.e., privacy amplification
remains equally secure against adversaries holding quantum
information.
This has interesting implications for quantum key distribu-
tion (QKD): In a QKD protocol, Alice and Bob first exchange
quantum information (e.g., polarized photons) to generate a
raw key X which is only partially secure, i.e., Eve has some
quantum information ρ about X . In a second (purely classical)
phase, Alice and Bob apply privacy amplification to generate
the final secret key K . Our result on the security of privacy
amplification thus reduces the problem of proving the security
of a QKD protocol to the problem of finding a bound on the
number of qubits needed to (reliably) store Eve’s information
ρ. In [10], this fact has been exploited to show the security
of a generic QKD protocol which, in particular, implies the
security of many known protocols such as BB84 [11]. This
simplifies and generalizes6 known security proofs (see e.g.,
3See Section II-A for a definition of two-universality.
4Equivalently, they can use an extractor [9].
5More precisely, her information is exponentially small in n− s− k.
6Most known security proofs are restricted to one specific QKD protocol.
2[12]) which are based on completely different techniques. It
also generalizes a proof by Ben-Or [13] which is based on
a similar idea using results from communication complexity
theory [14].
The paper is organized as follows. In Section III, we
introduce a general framework for modeling and quantifying
knowledge and storage devices. The framework is then used in
Section IV to state and prove bounds on the success probability
when guessing a binary predicate F of X given information
about X stored in a quantum storage device (Section IV-B).
These are then compared to the situation where the information
about X is purely classical (Section IV-C). In Section V,
the results are extended to non-binary functions which then
allows for proving the security of privacy amplification against
quantum adversaries (Section V-B).
II. PRELIMINARIES
A. Notation
Let F(X → Y) be the set of functions with domain X
and range Y . The set F(X → {0, 1}) of binary functions
with domain X , in the following called predicates on X , is
denoted as FXbin. Similarly, FXbal := {f ∈ FXbin : |f−1({0})| =
|f−1({1})|} is the set of balanced predicates on X .
Throughout this paper, random variables are denoted by cap-
ital letters (e.g., X), their range by corresponding calligraphic
letters (X ), and the values they take on by lower case letters
(x). The event that two random variables X and Y take on the
same value is denoted as X = Y . In contrast, we write X ≡ Y
if two random variables X and Y are identical (i.e., if X = Y
always holds). The expectation Ex←PX [f(x)] of a function f
on the random variable X is given by
∑
x∈X PX(x) f(x).
For a channel C from S to W and a random variable S on
S, we denote by CS the output of C on input S, i.e., if the
channel is defined by the conditional distributions PW |S=s for
s ∈ S, the joint probability distribution of CS and S is given
by PCSS(w, s) = P (s)PCS |S=s(w) for all (w, s) ∈ W × S.
A random function G from X to Y is a random variable
taking values from the set F(X → Y) of functions mapping
elements from X to Y . The set of random functions from X to
Y is denoted as R(X → Y). If G ∈ R(X → Y) is uniformly
distributed over F(X → Y), it is called a uniform random
function from X to Y . Similarly, a (uniform) random predicate
F on X is a random function with (uniform) distribution over
the set FXbin, and a (uniform) balanced random predicate is
(uniformly) distributed over the set FXbal. In the sequel, we
will only use random functions which are independent of all
other (previously defined) random variables.
A random function G from X to Y is called7 two-universal
if Pg←PG [g(x) = g(x′)] ≤ 1/|Y| holds for any distinct x, x′ ∈
X . In particular, G is two-universal if, for any distinct x, x′ ∈
X , the random variables G(x) and G(x′) are independent and
uniformly distributed. For instance, a uniform random function
from X to Y is two-universal. Non-trivial examples where
7In the literature, two-universality is usually defined for families G of
functions: A family G is called two-universal if the random function G with
uniform distribution over G is two-universal. For our purposes, however, our
more general definition is more convenient.
the distribution of G is over a smaller set of function (thus
requiring less randomness) can, e.g., be found in [15] and [16].
B. Distance from Uniform
The variational distance between two distributions P and
P ′ over an alphabet Z is defined as
δ(P, P ′) :=
1
2
∑
z∈Z
∣∣P (z)− P ′(z)∣∣ .
The variational distance δ(P, P¯ ) of a distribution P from
the uniform distribution P¯ (over the same alphabet Z) is of
particular interest in cryptographic applications. We will use
the abbreviation d(P ) for this quantity and refer to it as the
distance of P from uniform. For the distance of the distribution
of a random variable Z from uniform, we also write d(Z)
instead of d(PZ), and, more generally, for any event E ,
d(Z|E) := d(PZ|E ). Note that d is a convex function, i.e.,
for two probability distributions P and P ′, and q, q′ ∈ [0, 1]
with q+ q′ = 1, we have d(q P + q′ P ′) ≤ q d(P ) + q′ d(P ′).
The distance d(Z) of a random variable Z from uniform
has a natural interpretation: It equals the probability that Z
deviates from a uniformly distributed random variable Z¯ , in
the following sense.
Lemma 1: For any probability distribution PZ on Z there
exists a channel PZ¯|Z such that PZ¯ is the uniform distribution
on Z and P(z,z¯)←PZZ¯ [z = z¯] = 1− d(Z).
For two random variables Z and W , the (expected) distance
of Z from uniform given W is defined (cf. [2]) as the
expectation of the distance of Z from uniform conditioned on
W , i.e., d(Z|W ) := Ew←PW [d(PZ|W=w)]. It follows directly
from the convexity of d that d(Z|W ) ≥ d(Z), and, more
generally, for an additional random variable V and an event
E , d(Z|WV, E) ≥ d(Z|V, E).
III. MODELING KNOWLEDGE AND STORAGE
A. Knowledge and Guessing
Let Z be a random variable and let A be an entity
with knowledge described by a random variable W (jointly
distributed with Z according to some distribution PZW ).
Intuitively, one would say that A knows nothing about Z
if Z is uniformly distributed given A’s knowledge W , i.e.,
PZW ≡ PZ × PW where PZ is the uniform distribution. The
following straightforward generalization of Lemma 1 suggests
that the distance d(Z|W ) of Z from uniform given W can be
interpreted as the probability of deviating from this situation.
Lemma 2: For any probability distribution PWZ on W×Z
there exists a channel PZ¯|WZ such that PZ¯ is the uniform
distribution on Z , PZ¯W ≡ PZ¯ × PW , and P(z,z¯)←PZZ¯ [z =
z¯] = 1− d(Z|W ).
This is of particular interest in cryptography, where, for
instance, A is an adversary with knowledge W and where
one wants to use Z as a key. Typically, a cryptosystem based
on a key Z¯ is secure when Z¯ is uniformly distributed and
independent of A’s knowledge. The lemma implies that, with
probability 1− d(Z|W ), Z is equal to such a perfect key Z¯.
This means that any statement which is true for an ideal setting
3where Z¯ is used as a key automatically holds, with probability
at least 1− d(Z|W ), for a real setting where Z is the key.
The distance from uniform d(Z|W ) is also a measure for
the maximum success probability Pguess(Z|W ) of an entity A
knowing W when trying to guess Z ,
Pguess(Z|W ) := max
C
P
(w,z)←PWZ
[Cw = z] ,
where the maximum is over all channels C from W to Z .8
The following lemma is an immediate consequence of the
simple fact that the best strategy for guessing Z given W = w
is to choose a value zˆ maximizing the probability PZ|W (zˆ|w).
Lemma 3: Let W and Z be random variables. Then
Pguess(Z|W ) ≤ 1|Z| + d(Z|W ) where equality holds if Z is
binary.
B. Selectable Knowledge
The characterization of knowledge about a random variable
Z held by an entity A in terms of a random variable W is
sufficient whenever this knowledge is fully accessible, e.g.,
written down on a sheet of paper or stored in a classical storage
device. However, in a more general context A might have an
option as to which information she can obtain. For example,
if her information about Z is encoded into the state ρ of a
quantum system, she may select one arbitrary measurement
to “read it out”. Formally, every measurement corresponds to
a channel W from the state space of the quantum system to
the set of possible measurement outcomes. The situation is
thus completely characterized by the set of measurements (that
is, channels) W and the joint distribution of Z and ρ. This
setting is discussed in detail in Section III-D. Another (more
artificial) example might be a storage unit which can hold two
bits S ≡ B1B2, but which allows only to read out one of these
bits, i.e., A can read either the value B1 or B2. In this case, the
situation is described by the joint distribution of Z and S and
the set of channels {p1, p2}, where channel pi maps (b1, b2)
to bi for i = 1, 2. To model these situations, it is useful to
introduce the following notion.
Definition 4: A selectable channel W on S with range W
is a set of channels from S to W .
Consider now a setting as described above, i.e., there is a
system which is in a state described by a random variable S
on S, and an entity A has access to S by means of a channel
W from a set W. In the following, we say that an entity A
has selectable knowledge WS , meaning that A can learn the
value of exactly one arbitrarily chosen random variable WS
with W ∈ W. The knowledge of A about a random variable
Z can then be quantified by a natural generalization of the
distance measure introduced above.
Definition 5: Let S and Z be random variables and let W
be a selectable channel on the range of S. The distance of Z
from uniform given WS , is
d(Z|WS) := max
W∈W
d(Z|WS) .
The significance of this generalized definition of distance
from uniform, e.g., in cryptography, is implied by a straight-
forward extension of Lemma 2.
8Recall that CW denotes the output of the channel C on input W .
Lemma 6: Let S and Z be random variables and let W be
a selectable channel on the range of S. Then for any choice
of an element W of W, there exists a random variable Z¯
defined by a channel PZ¯|WSZ , such that PZ¯ is the uniform
distribution on Z , PWS Z¯ ≡ PWS × PZ¯ , and P(z,z¯)←PZ¯Z [z¯ =
z] ≥ 1− d(Z|WS).
Similarly, Lemma 3 can be generalized to obtain a bound
for the maximum success probability of an entity A with
selectable knowledge WS when guessing Z ,
Pguess(Z|WS) := max
W∈W
Pguess(Z|WS) .
Lemma 7: Let S and Z be random variables and let W be
a selectable channel on the range of S. Then Pguess(Z|WS) ≤
1
|Z| + d(Z|WS), where equality holds if Z is binary.
Consider now a situation where the information about Z of
an entity A is described by both some selectable knowledge
WS , and, additionally, a random variable U which she can use
to choose an element from W. More precisely, she applies
some channel C = PW |U from U to W to the random
variable U and then chooses to learn WS for the resulting
W ≡ CU ∈ W. We will then be interested in the maximal
distance of Z from uniform resulting from an optimal strategy
used by A. Such an optimal strategy consists simply of
(deterministically) choosing some W ∈ W which maximizes
Ew←PWS [d(PZ|WS=w,U=u)], given U = u. We thus introduce
the following quantity.
Definition 8: Let S, U and Z be random variables and let
W be a selectable channel on the range of S. The distance of
Z from uniform given WS and U is defined as
d(Z|WS ;U) := E
u←PU
[
max
W∈W
d(Z|WS , U = u)
]
. (1)
It is easy to see that
d(Z|WS ;U) = d(Z|V(S,U))
for some selectable channel V on S×U which models the fact
that A can choose an arbitrary strategy. In particular, Lemma 6
and Lemma 7 still hold when WS is replaced by WS ;U ,
where Pguess(Z|WS ;U) is defined as the maximal probability
of A when guessing Z in the situation described above.
It is a direct consequence of the properties of the variational
distance that knowledge of an additional random variable U
can only increase the distance from uniform given selectable
knowledge.
Lemma 9: Let S, U and Z be random variables and let W
be a selectable channel on the domain of S. Then
d(Z|WS ;U) ≥ d(Z|WS) .
C. Storage Devices
A (physical) storage device is a physical system where the
information it contains is determined by its physical state
s. Information is stored in the device by choosing a state
s from its state space S. A storage device might provide
different mechanisms to read out this information, each of
them resulting in some (generally only partial) information
about its state s. However, any possible strategy of accessing
the stored information can be described as a channel mapping
4the memory state to a random variable W . We thus define a
storage device with state space S and range W as a selectable
channel p from S to W .
As an example, consider the (artificial) storage device
mentioned above which allows to store two bits, but where
only one of them can be read out. Formally, this storage device
is a selectable channel p = {p1, p2} from the state space
S = {0, 1}×{0, 1} to the set {0, 1} where pm is the channel
mapping (b1, b2) to bm, for m ∈ {1, 2}.
The most trivial case is a classical storage device for storing
s bits and allowing to read out all s bits without errors.
Obviously, its state s can take one of 2s possible values.
Moreover, any accessing strategy corresponds to a channel
with input s. Formally, a classical s-bit storage device is
defined as the selectable channel C2s containing all channels
taking inputs from the set {0, 1}s. (In Section III-D, we will
give an analogous definition for quantum storage devices.)
Note that for a random variable Z and a random variable S
on {0, 1}s, d(Z|C2sS ) = d(Z|S). Thus we omit to mention
the selectable channel if it is clear from the context, e.g., we
write d(Z|S;U) instead of d(Z|C2sS ;U).
D. Quantum Storage
An s-qubit storage device is a quantum system of dimension
d = 2s where information is stored by encoding it into the state
of the system. This information can (partially) be read out by
measuring the system’s state with respect to some (arbitrarily
chosen) measurement basis. Each pure state of a d-dimensional
quantum system corresponds to a normalized vector |ψ〉 in a
d-dimensional Hilbert space Hd. Equivalently, the set of pure
states can be identified with the set P(Hd) := {|ψ〉〈ψ| : |ψ〉 ∈
Hd, |〈ψ|ψ〉| = 1} where |ψ〉〈ψ| is the projection operator in
Hd along the vector |ψ〉. The set of all possible states of
the quantum system is then given by the set of mixed states
S(Hd), which is the convex hull of P(Hd).
It is well known from quantum information theory that the
most general strategy to access the information contained in
a quantum system is to perform a positive operator-valued
measurement (POVM), which gives a classical measurement
outcome W . Any possible measurement is specified by a
family {Ew}w∈W of nonnegative operators on Hd satisfy-
ing
∑
w∈W Ew = idHd . If the system is in state ρ, the
probability of obtaining the (classical) measurement outcome
w ∈ W when applying measurement {Ew}w∈W is given by
p{Ew}(w|ρ) := tr(Ewρ).
In the framework presented in the previous section, a d-
dimensional quantum storage device Qd is thus defined as the
set of channels p{Ew} describing all possible POVMs {Ew}
on a d-dimensional quantum state, i.e.,
Qd := {p{Ew} : {Ew} ∈ POVM(Hd)} .
A general way of describing this setting is to define the
state S of the storage device by a family of quantum states
{ρx}x∈X ⊂ S(Hd), where ρx is the conditional state of the
system given X = x, that is S ≡ ρX . Similar to the notation
introduced for classical storage devices C2s , we will also write
ρX instead of QdρX .
According to Definition 5, the distance d(Z|ρX) of a
random variable Z from uniform given ρX can be written
as
d(Z|ρX) = max{Ew} d(Z|W )
where the maximum is taken over all POVMs {Ew} and
where W is the measurement outcome of {Ew} applied to
the quantum state, i.e., PW |X=x(w) = tr(Ewρx). Similarly,
for an additional random variable U ,
d(Z|ρX ;U) = E
u←PU
[
max
{Euw}
d(Z|W,U = u)]
where, for each u, {Euw} is a POVM and where W is defined
by PW |X=x,U=u(w) = tr(Euwρx).
IV. QUANTUM KNOWLEDGE ABOUT PREDICATES
A. The Quantum Binary Decision Problem
We begin this section by stating a few known results
about the so-called quantum binary decision problem, which
are central to the proof of our main statements concerning
quantum knowledge.
Let ρ0, ρ1 ∈ S(H) be arbitrary (mixed) states of a quantum
mechanical system H, and suppose that the system is prepared
either in the state ρ = ρ0 or in ρ = ρ1 with a priori
probabilities q and 1 − q, respectively. The quantum binary
decision problem is the problem of deciding between these
two possibilities by an appropriate measurement. Any deci-
sion strategy can be summarized by a binary valued POVM
{E0, E1}, where the hypothesis Hi : ρ = ρi is chosen
whenever the outcome is i ∈ {0, 1}. For a fixed strategy
{E0, E1}, the probability of choosing Hi, when the actual
state is ρj , is given by P[Hi|ρ = ρj ] = tr(Eiρj), i, j ∈ {0, 1}.
Thus the expected probability of success for this strategy
equals
P¯ {E0,E1}q (ρ0, ρ1) := q tr(E0ρ0) + (1− q) tr(E1ρ1) .
The maximum achievable expected success probability in the
binary decision problem is the quantity
P¯maxq (ρ0, ρ1) := sup
{E0,E1}∈POVM
P¯ {E0,E1}q (ρ0, ρ1) .
The following theorem is due to Helstrom [17]. We state it
using the notation of Fuchs [18] who also gave a simple proof
of it.
Theorem 10: Let ρ0, ρ1 ∈ S(Hd) be two states, let q ∈
[0, 1], and let {µi}di=1 be the eigenvalues of the Hermitian
operator Λ := q ρ0−(1−q) ρ1. Then the maximum achievable
expected success probability in the quantum binary decision
problem is
P¯maxq (ρ0, ρ1) =
1
2
+
1
2
d∑
i=1
|µi| .
5B. Bounds on Quantum Knowledge
Let X be a random variable and let F be a randomly chosen
predicate on X . The goal of this section is to derive a bound
on the distance of F (X) from uniform given knowledge about
X stored in a quantum storage device.
Such knowledge is modeled by a family of quantum states
{ρx}x∈X , where ρx is the state of the quantum system
conditioned on the event that X = x. An explicit expression
for the corresponding quantity can be obtained using a result
on the quantum binary decision problem (cf. Section IV-A).
Lemma 11: Let X be a random variable with range X and
let F be a random predicate on X . Let {ρx}x∈X ⊂ S(Hd) be
a family of quantum states on a d-dimensional Hilbert space.
Then
d(F (X)|ρX ;F ) = 1
2
E
f←PF
[ d∑
j=1
|µfj |
]
,
where {µfj }dj=1 are the eigenvalues of the Hermitian operator
Λf :=
∑
x:f(x)=0
PX(x)ρx−
∑
x:f(x)=1
PX(x)ρx , for f ∈ FXbin.
Proof: It suffices to show that
d(f(X)|ρX) = 1
2
d∑
j=1
|µfj | (2)
for every f ∈ FXbin. Let thus f be fixed and assume for
simplicity that Pf(X)(0) > 0 and Pf(X)(1) > 0 (otherwise,
(2) is trivially satisfied).
Let z ∈ {0, 1}. Conditioned on the event that f(X) = z, the
state ρ equals ρx with probability PX|f(X)(x|z). This situation
can equivalently be described by saying that the system is in
the mixed state σfz ∈ S(Hd), where
σfz =
∑
x:f(x)=z
PX|f(X)(x|z)ρx .
The problem of guessing f(X) thus corresponds exactly to the
quantum binary decision problem described in Section IV-A,
i.e.,
Pguess(f(X)|ρ) = P¯maxPf(X)(0)(σ
f
0 , σ
f
1 ) =
1
2
+
1
2
d∑
j=1
|µfj |
where the second equality follows from Theorem 10. Finally,
since f(X) is binary, equation (2) follows from Lemma 7.
The expression for the distance of F (X) from uniform
provided by Lemma 11 is generally difficult to evaluate. The
following theorem gives a much simpler upper bound for this
quantity.9
Theorem 12: Let X be a random variable with range X and
let F be a random predicate on X . Let further {ρx}x∈X ⊂
9The main idea in the proof of Theorem 12 is to replace occurrences of
density operators by their squares. The resulting expressions correspond to
classical collision probabilities, as used in the well-known classical analysis
of privacy amplification. The application of Jensen’s inequality corresponds
to the transition from the variational to the Euclidean distance. In this sense,
this proof can be seen as a generalization of the classical derivation.
S(Hd) be a family of states on a d-dimensional Hilbert space.
Then
d(F (X)|ρX ;F ) ≤ 1
2
d
1
2
√ ∑
x,x′∈X
PX(x)PX(x′)λx,x′tr(ρxρx′)
where λx,x′ := 2 Pf←PF [f(x) = f(x′)]− 1, for x, x′ ∈ X .
Proof: We set out from the equation
d(F (X)|ρX ;F ) = 1
2
E
f←PF
[ d∑
j=1
|µfj |
]
provided by Lemma 11. Note that, for any f ∈ FXbin,
d∑
j=1
|µfj | ≤ d
1
2
√√√√ d∑
j=1
|µfj |2 = d
1
2
√
tr(Λ2f ) ,
where the inequality is Jensen’s inequality (applied to the
convex mapping x 7→ x2) and where the equality is a
consequence of Schur’s (in)equality (cf. Lemma 20), which
can be applied because Λf is Hermitian and thus also normal.
We conclude that
d(F (X)|ρX ;F ) ≤ 1
2
d
1
2 E
f←PF
[√
tr(Λ2f )
]
≤ 1
2
d
1
2
√
E
f←PF
[tr(Λ2f )] ,
(3)
where Jensen’s inequality is applied once again.
By the definition of Λf in Lemma 11, we have
tr(Λ2f ) =
∑
x,x′∈X
f(x)=f(x′)
PX(x)PX (x
′)tr(ρxρx′)
−
∑
x,x′∈X
f(x) 6=f(x′)
PX(x)PX(x
′)tr(ρxρx′)
=
∑
x,x′∈X
(2δf(x),f(x′) − 1)PX(x)PX(x′)tr(ρxρx′) ,
where δy,y′ is the Kronecker delta10. The assertion then
follows by taking the expectation of this expression over F
and combining the result with (3).
If F is two-universal, the quantity on the right hand side
of Theorem 12 can be bounded by an expression which is
independent of the particular storage function.
Corollary 13: Let X be a random variable with range X
and let F be a two-universal random predicate on X . Then for
every family {ρx}x∈X ⊂ S(Hd) of states on a d-dimensional
Hilbert space
d(F (X)|ρX ;F ) ≤ 1
2
d
1
2
√∑
x∈X
P 2X(x) .
Proof: Since F is two-universal, the values λx,x′ (as de-
fined in Theorem 12) cannot be positive for any distinct x, x′ ∈
X . Since tr(ρxρx′) ≥ 0, we conclude that λx,x′ tr(ρxρx′) ≤ 0
for x 6= x′. Moreover, λx,x = 1 and tr(ρxρx) ≤ 1, for any
x ∈ X . Combining these facts, the assertion follows directly
from the upper bound given by Theorem 12.
10δy,y′ equals 1 if y = y′ and 0 otherwise.
6Note that the expression under the square root is simply
the collision probability PC(X) of X . Hence, with the Re´nyi
entropy R(X) = − log2 PC(X), the above inequality can be
rewritten as
d(F (X)|ρX ;F ) ≤ 1
2
2−
R(X)−s
2 , (4)
where s is the number of qubits in which X is stored, i.e.,
{ρx}x∈X ⊂ S(H2s).
C. Comparing Classical and Quantum Storage Devices
Since orthogonal states of a quantum system can always be
perfectly distinguished, a random variable X can always be
stored and perfectly retrieved in a quantum storage device of
dimension d as long as the size of the range of X does not
exceed d. Hence, a classical s-bit storage device C2scannot
be more powerful than a storage device Q2s consisting of s
qubits. Formally, this can be stated as follows. For any random
variables X and S on X and {0, 1}s, respectively, there is a
family of states {ρx}x∈X ⊂ S(H2s) such that
d(F (X)|SF ) ≤ d(F (X)|ρX ;F ) , for any F ∈ R(X → Y).
(5)
The following lemma shows that, on the other hand, a
quantum storage device can indeed be more useful than a
corresponding classical storage device. However, we will see
later that this is only true for special cases, e.g., if the
difference between the number n of bits to be stored and the
capacity s of the storage device is small.
Lemma 14: Let X be uniformly distributed over {0, 1}2
and let F be a uniform balanced predicate on {0, 1}2. Then
for any random variable S on {0, 1} defined by a channel
PS|X ,
d(F (X)|SF ) ≤ 1
4
.
Similarly, for every family {ρx}x∈{0,1}2 ⊂ S(H2) of quantum
states on a 2-dimensional Hilbert space
d(F (X)|ρX ;F ) ≤ 1
2
√
3
≈ 0.289 ,
and there exists families {ρx}x∈{0,1}2 ⊂ S(H2) saturating this
bound.
Proof: By the convexity of the variational distance, it
suffices to consider random variables S which depend in a
deterministic way on X , that is, S ≡ ϕc(X) for some function
ϕc : {0, 1}2 → {0, 1}. It can easily be verified (by an explicit
calculation) that
d(F (X)|ϕc(X)F ) ≤ 1
4
for any function ϕc from {0, 1}2 to {0, 1}, and that equality
holds for ϕc : (x1, x2) 7→ x1 · x2 (i.e., ϕc(x1, x2) = 1 if
and only if x1 = x2 = 1). This proves the first (classical)
statement of the lemma.
For the second (quantum) statement, for the same rea-
son as above, it suffices to consider pure states only. Let
{|ψx〉〈ψx|}x∈{0,1}2 ⊂ S(H2) be an arbitrary family of pure
quantum states. It follows from the linearity of the trace
and Lemma 21, applied to the Hermitian operator A :=∑
x∈X |ψx〉〈ψx|, that∑
x,x′∈X
|〈ψx|ψx′〉|2 ≥ |X |2/d .
The bound d(F (X)||ψX〉〈ψX |;F ) ≤ 1/(2
√
3) can then be
obtained from Theorem 12 with Pf←PF [f(x) = f(x′)] = 13
for distinct x, x′ (implying λx,x′ = − 13 ).
It remains to be proven that d(F (X)||ψX〉〈ψX |;F ) =
1/(2
√
3) for a family of states {|ψx〉〈ψx|}x∈{0,1}2 ⊂ S(H2).
Such states can be defined by setting |ψ00〉,|ψ01〉 |ψ10〉 and
|ψ11〉 to the vertices of a tetrahedron in P(H2) (or, more
precisely, in the Bloch sphere which corresponds to P(H2)).
The assertion then follows from a straightforward calculation.
Together with Lemma 7, Lemma 14 implies that the max-
imum probability of correctly guessing a randomly chosen
balanced predicate F about a random 2-bit string X is larger
if information about X can be stored in one qubit (Pq =
0.789) than if this information is stored in one classical bit
(Pc = 0.75). Note that this is in accordance with earlier results
showing that one individual qubit can be stronger than one
classical bit (see, e.g., [4]).
Surprisingly, this advantage of a quantum storage device
becomes negligible if the difference n− s between the length
n of the bitstring X and the number s of bits/qubits of the
storage device becomes large. To see this, let us first state a
lower bound for the distance of F (X) from uniform given the
knowledge stored in a classical storage device.
Lemma 15: Let X be uniformly distributed on {0, 1}n and
let F be a uniform random predicate on {0, 1}n. Then for any
s < n there exists a random variable S on {0, 1}s defined by
a channel PS|X such that
1
2
C(2n−s) ≤ d(F (X)|SF ) (6)
where C(m) :=
(
m
m/2
)
2−m =
√
2
pim (1+O(
1
m )). In particular,
1√
2pi
2−
n−s
2 (1 +O(2−(n−s))) ≤ d(F (X)|SF ) .
Proof: Let ϕ be a function from {0, 1}n to {0, 1}s
such that for any w ∈ {0, 1}s, the set ϕ−1({w}) := {x ∈
{0, 1}n : ϕ(x) = w} has size 2n−s. We claim that S ≡ ϕ(X)
satisfies (6).
For any fixed w ∈ {0, 1}s and f ∈ F{0,1}nbin ,
d(f(X)|ϕ(X) = w) =
∣∣ P
f←PF
[f(X) = 0|ϕ(X) = w]− 12
∣∣
=
∣∣∣ kf
2n−s
− 12
∣∣∣ ,
where kf := |f−1({0}) ∩ ϕ−1({w})|. Since F is uniformly
distributed on the set F{0,1}nbin , we have Pf←PF [kf = k] =(
2n−s
k
)
2−2
n−s for k ∈ {0, . . . , 2n−s}, hence
d(f(X)|ϕ(X) = w) =
2n−s∑
k=0
∣∣∣ k
2n−s
− 1
2
∣∣∣(2n−s
k
)
2−2
n−s
=
1
2
C(2n−s) ,
7where the last equality follows from equation (14) of
Lemma 22. As w ∈ {0, 1}s was arbitrary, this concludes the
proof. (The approximation for C(m) can be obtained from
Lemma 23.)
Combining Lemma 15 with inequalities (4) and (5), we
conclude that the distance from uniform has the same asymp-
totic behavior for the classical and the quantum case: The
knowledge about the predicate F (X) decreases exponentially
in the difference n− s between the length of the bitstring X
and the size s of the storage device.
More precisely, since, for n− s ≥ 1,
1
2
C(2n−s) ≥ 1
2
2−
n−(s−1)
2
it follows from Lemma 15 and (4) that there exists a random
variable S on {0, 1}s defined by a channel PS|X such that
d(F (X)|SF ) ≥ d(F (X)|ρX ;F ) for any family of states
{ρx}x∈{0,1}n ⊂ S(H2s−1 ). This means that storing informa-
tion about X in s classical bits instead of s− 1 quantum bits
allows to predict F (X) with a lower error probability.
V. FROM THE BINARY TO THE NON-BINARY CASE
A. Relations Between Bounds on Knowledge
We start with a lemma bounding the distance of a random
variableX from uniform by the distance of a binary hash value
F (X) from uniform where F is a randomly chosen balanced
predicate. This is related to the Vazirani XOR lemma (see
e.g., [19]), which gives a similar bound for the case where F
is chosen randomly from the set of all linear functions.11
Lemma 16 (Hashing Lemma): Let X be a random variable
with range X and let F be a uniform balanced random
predicate on X . Then
d(X) ≤ 3
2
√
|X | d(F (X)|F ) .
Proof: For any probability distribution Q over X and any
f ∈ FXbal, let df (Q) := d(f(X ′)) be the distance between the
uniform distribution and the distribution of f(X ′) where X ′
is a random variable distributed according to Q. We have to
show that
d(Q) ≤ 3
2
√
|X | E
f←PF
[df (Q)] , (7)
for any distribution Q over X . Defining the coefficients
ax(Q) := Q(x)− 1|X | , and the sets X+Q := {x ∈ X : ax(Q) ≥
0} and X−Q := X − X+Q , we obtain
d(Q) =
∑
x∈X+
Q
ax(Q) = −
∑
x∈X−
Q
ax(Q) (8)
and, for any f ∈ FXbal and X 0f := {x ∈ X : f(x) = 0},
df (Q) =
∣∣ ∑
x∈X 0
f
ax(Q)
∣∣ , (9)
11 The following version of Vazirani’s XOR lemma is proved in [20]:
d(X) ≤
√
|X |
√
Eℓ←PL
[d(ℓ(X))2 ], where PL is the uniform distribution
on the set of all non-zero linear functions from X to {0, 1}.
respectively. Note that, since d is convex, df is convex as
well and thus so is its expected value Ef←PF [df (·)] (i.e., the
function defined by Q 7→ Ef←PF [df (Q)]).
Let us first show that inequality (7) holds for distributions Q¯
over X where the probabilities only take two possible values,
|Q¯(X )| ≤ 2, i.e., there exist a+ ≥ 0 and a− ≤ 0 such that
ax(Q¯) = a
+ for x ∈ X+
Q¯
and ax(Q¯) = a− for x ∈ X−Q¯ .
Then the value df (Q¯) in (9) only depends on the number
k(f) := |X 0f ∩ X+Q¯ | of values x ∈ X+Q¯ for which f(x) = 0.
To get some intuition, consider the case where |X+
Q¯
| =
1
2 |X |. Since f is randomly chosen, the expected deviation of
k(f) from its average value 14 |X | is proportional to
√
|X |.
Furthermore, df (Q¯) is proportional to this deviation and a+,
and a+ is proportional to d(Q¯) and inverse proportional to |X |.
Neglecting the constants, this already shows that (7) holds in
this particular case.
Proving the exact statement (7) requires a little bit more
computation. For any predicate f ∈ FXbal, expression (9) reads
df (Q¯) =
∣∣ ∑
x∈X 0
f
∩X+
Q¯
a+ +
∑
x∈X 0
f
∩X−
Q¯
a−
∣∣
=
∣∣k(f) a+ + (n
2
− k(f)) a−∣∣
where n := |X |. With s := |X+
Q¯
|, expression (8) implies
a+ =
d(Q¯)
s
and a− = − d(Q¯)
n− s ,
and hence
df (Q¯) =
∣∣d(Q¯)(k(f)(1
s
+
1
n− s )−
n
2
1
n− s
)∣∣
= d(Q¯)
∣∣k(f)− s
2
∣∣ n
s(n− s) .
Consequently, for Q = Q¯, inequality (7) is equivalent to
1
|FXbal|
n
s(n− s)
∑
f∈FXbal
|k(f)− s
2
| ≥ 2
3
√
n
.
Since the term in the sum over FXbal only depends on k(f),
the sum can be replaced by a sum over k, i.e., we have to
show that
1(
n
n
2
) n
s(n− s)
min(s,n2 )∑
k=max(0,s−n2 )
(
s
k
)(
n− s
n
2 − k
)
|k − s
2
|
=
(n2 !)
2 s! (n− s)!n
n! s(n− s) Sn,s ≥
2
3
√
n
(10)
with
Sn,s =
min(s,n2 )∑
k=max(0,−n2+s)
|k − s2 |
k! (s− k)! (n2 − s+ k)! (n2 − k)!
.
The term Sn,s has different analytic solutions depending on
whether s is even or odd. Let us first assume that s is even.
Replacing the summation index k by k¯ = k − s2 and making
8use of the symmetry of the resulting terms with respect to the
sign of k¯, we get
Sn,s = 2
min( s2 ,
n−s
2 )∑
k¯=0
k¯
( s2 + k¯)! (
s
2 − k¯)! (n−s2 + k¯)! (n−s2 − k¯)!
=
s(n− s)
2n ( s2 !)
2 (n−s2 !)
2
,
where the second equality follows from equation (15) of
Lemma 22 with a = s2 and b =
n−s
2 . A straightforward
calculation then shows that for fixed n the minimum of the
left hand side of the inequality in (10) is taken for s as close
as possible to n2 , i.e., s = 2⌊n4 ⌋ and n− s = 2⌈n4 ⌉, that is
(n2 !)
2 s! (n− s)!n
n! s(n− s) Sn,s ≥
n
2 !
2 s! (n− s)!
2n! ( s2 !)
2 (n−s2 !)
2
≥
n
2 !
2 (2⌊n4 ⌋)! (2⌈n4 ⌉)!
2n! (⌊n4 ⌋!)2 (⌈n4 ⌉!)2
.
Lemma 23 is then used to derive a lower bound for the term
on the right hand side of this inequality, leading to
(n2 !)
2 s! (n− s)!n
n! s(n− s) Sn,s
≥
√
2
pin
e
2
6n+1+
1
24⌊n
4
⌋+1
+ 1
24⌈n
4
⌉+1
− 112n− 16⌊n
4
⌋
− 1
6⌈n
4
⌉ ≥ 2
3
√
n
,
where the last inequality holds for n ≥ 6.
Similarly, for s odd, applying equation (16) of Lemma 22
with a = s−12 and b =
n−s−1
2 leads to
Sn,s = 2
min(a,b)∑
k¯=0
|k¯ + 12 |
(a+ k¯ + 1)! (a− k¯)! (b + k¯ + 1)! (b− k¯)!
=
2
n ( s−12 !)
2 (n−s−12 !)
2
,
resulting in the same lower bound 2
3
√
n
for the left hand side
of the inequality in (10) for n ≥ 8. Moreover, an explicit
calculation shows that (10) also holds for n = 2, n = 4, and
n = 6 which concludes the proof of inequality (7) for Q = Q¯
with |Q¯(X )| ≤ 2.
Let now Q be an arbitrary distribution on X and let Γ be
the set of permutations on X with invariant sets X+Q and X−Q ,
i.e., γ(X+Q ) = X+Q and γ(X−Q ) = X−Q , for γ ∈ Γ. Since
d(Q) = d(Q ◦ γ) for γ ∈ Γ, we find that
Q¯ :=
1
|Γ|
∑
γ∈Γ
Q ◦ γ
is a probability distribution satisfying d(Q¯) = d(Q) and taking
identical probabilities for all elements in X+Q as well as for
all elements in X−Q , i.e., |Q¯(X )| ≤ 2. Since inequality (7) is
already proven for distributions of this form, we conclude
d(Q) = d(Q¯) ≤ 3
2
√
|X | E
f←PF
[df (Q¯)]
≤ 3
2
√
|X | 1|Γ|
∑
γ∈Γ
E
f←PF
[df (Q ◦ γ)] ,
where the second inequality is a consequence of the convexity
of Ef←PF [df (·)]. Assertion (7) then follows from df (Q ◦
γ) = df◦γ−1(Q), for all f ∈ FXbal, γ ∈ Γ, and the fact
that F ◦ γ−1 is a uniform balanced random predicate, i.e.,
Ef←PF [df◦γ−1(Q)] = Ef←PF [df (Q)].
In order to apply the hashing lemma to generalize the
results of the previous section to the non-binary case, we
need a relation between binary random functions (i.e., random
predicates) and non-binary random functions.
Lemma 17: Let G be a two-universal random function from
X to Y and let F be a uniform balanced random predicate on
Y . Then the random predicate H := F ◦G is two-universal.
Proof: For any distinct x, x′ ∈ X ,
P
h←PH
[h(x) = h(x′)] = P
g←PG
[g(x) = g(x′)]
+(1− P
g←PG
[g(x) = g(x′)]) P
f←PF
g←PG|G(x)6=G(x′)
[f(g(x)) = f(g(x′))] .
Note that Pf←PF ,g←PG|G(x)6=G(x′) [f(g(x)) = f(g(x
′))] is the
collision probability of the uniform balanced random predicate
F , Pf←PF [f(y) = f(y
′)] (for distinct y, y′ ∈ Y), which can
easily be computed,
P
f←PF
[f(y) = f(y′)] =
|Y| − 2
2 (|Y| − 1) .
Since G is two-universal, i.e., Pg←PG [g(x) = g(x′)] ≤ 1|Y| ,
we have
P
h←PH
[h(x) = h(x′)]
= P
g←PG
[g(x) = g(x′)]
(
1− P
f←PF
[f(y) = f(y′)]
)
+ P
f←PF
[f(y) = f(y′)]
≤ 1|Y| +
(
1− 1|Y|
)
P
f←PF
[f(y) = f(y′)]
=
1
|Y| +
(
1− 1|Y|
) |Y| − 2
2 (|Y| − 1) =
1
2
,
i.e., the random predicate H is two-universal.
Combining Lemma 16 and Lemma 17 leads to a relation
between the distance from uniform of the outcomes of binary
and general (non-binary) two-universal functions on a random
variable X , given some knowledge WS .12
Theorem 18: Let X and S be random variables on X and
S, respectively and let W be a selectable channel on S. If,
for all two-universal random predicates H on X ,
d(H(X)|WS ;H) ≤ ε , (11)
then, for all two-universal random functions G from X to Y ,
d(G(X)|WS ;G) ≤ 3
2
√
|Y| ε . (12)
Proof: From Definition (1), we have
d(G(X)|WS ;G) = E
g←PG
[
max
W∈W
d(g(X)|WS)
]
12 Using the version of Vazirani’s XOR-Lemma stated in Footnote 11, the
constant 3
2
in the bound (12) of Theorem 18 can be eliminated by replacing
condition (11) by the stronger requirement
√
Eh←PH
[d(h(X)|WS)2] ≤ ε.
9The expression in the maximum can then be bounded using
Lemma 16, that is
d(g(X)|WS) ≤ 3
2
√
|Y| d(F (g(X))|WSF ).
This leads to
d(G(X)|WS ;G) ≤ 3
2
√
|Y| E
g←PG
[
max
W∈W
d(F (g(X))|WSF )
]
≤ 3
2
√
|Y| E
f←PF
g←PG
[
max
W∈W
d(f(g(X))|WS)
]
Defining H := F ◦G, we obtain
d(G(X)|WS ;G) ≤ 3
2
√
|Y| E
h←PH
[
max
W∈W
d(h(X)|WS)
]
=
3
2
√
|Y| d(H(X)|WS ;H).
Finally, Lemma 17 states that H is a two-universal random
predicate on X , hence the assertion of the theorem follows.
B. Application: Privacy Amplification with a Quantum Adver-
sary
Consider two parties, Alice and Bob, being connected by
an authentic but otherwise completely insecure communica-
tion channel. Assume that they initially share a uniformly
distributed n-bit key X about which an adversary Eve has
some partial information, where the only bound known on
Eve’s information is that it consists of no more than s bits.
Privacy amplification, introduced by Bennett, Brassard, and
Robert [7], is a method to transformX into an almost perfectly
secure key K . It has been shown that if Alice and Bob publicly
(by communication over the insecure channel) choose a two-
universal random function G mapping the n-bit string to an
k-bit string K = G(X), for k smaller than n − s, then
the resulting string K is secure (i.e., Eve has virtually no
information about K). Note that n−s is roughly Eve’s entropy
about the initial string X , i.e., privacy amplification with
two-universal random functions is asymptotically optimal with
respect to the number of extractable key bits. In our formalism,
the possibility of privacy amplification by applying a (two-
universal) random function G, as proved in [7] (a simplified
proof has been given in [8]), reads
d(G(X)|SG) = O(2− n−s−k2 ) (13)
for any random variable S on {0, 1}s defined by a channel
PS|X .
Combining the results from the previous section, we obtain
a similar statement for the situation where Eve’s knowledge
about X is stored in s quantum instead of s classical bits.
More precisely, we can derive a bound on the distance of the
final key K ≡ G(X) from uniform, from an adversary’s point
of view, where G is a two-universal random function applied
to an initial string X , assuming only that the adversary’s
knowledge about X is stored in a limited number s of qubits.13
Corollary 19: Let X be a random variable with range X
and Re´nyi entropy R(X) = n and let G be a two-universal
random function from X to {0, 1}k. Then, for any family of
states {ρx}x∈X ⊂ S(H2s)
d(G(X)|ρX ;G) ≤ 3
4
2−
n−s−k
2 .
Proof: Theorem 18 together with Corollary 13 implies
d(G(X)|ρX ;G) ≤ 3
4
√
2k · 2s
∑
x∈X
P 2X(x)
for any family of states {ρx}x∈X ⊂ S(H2s). The corollary
then follows from the definition of the Re´nyi entropy (cf.
remark after the proof of Corollary 13).
We thus have a quantum analogue to (13), implying that
privacy amplification remains equally secure (with the same
parameters) if an adversary has quantum rather than only
classical bits to store her information. Note that a similar
bound follows from [13] together with a result of [5], for the
case where G is the inner product with a randomly chosen
string.
This generalization of the security proof of privacy amplifi-
cation immediately extends a result by Csisza´r and Ko¨rner [21]
(see also [22]) to the quantum case. Consider a situation where
Alice and Bob share information described by N independent
realizations of random variables X and Y , respectively, and
where Eve has information described by realizations of a
classical random variable Z . The result of [21] says that the
number of secret key bits that can be generated by one-way
communication (from Alice to Bob) over a public channel
is at least (roughly) N(I(X ;Y ) − I(X ;Z)), for large N .
The protocol that Alice and Bob have to apply consists of an
error correction step followed by a privacy amplification step
using a two-universal random function. If we now consider
a situation where Eve holds s qubits of quantum information
about X , it follows immediately from Corollary 19 that the
same protocol can be used to generate a secret key of length
roughly N(I(X ;Y )− s).
In most QKD protocols, Alice encodes some classical
information X into the state of a quantum system and sends
it to Bob. Upon receiving this state, Bob applies a measure-
ment, resulting in classical information Y . After this step,
the adversary might hold some quantum information about
X and Y . The situation is thus characterized by classical
random variables X and Y together with the quantum system
of Eve, where the size of her system depends on the error rate
tolerated by the protocol (see [10]). Hence, the generalization
of the Csisza´r-Ko¨rner bound described above directly gives an
13 Note that this is an example illustrating the fact that a bound on the
expected distance of a single bit H(X) from uniform d(H(X)|WS ;H)
suffices to derive bounds on the expected distance from uniform
d(G(X)|WS ;G) of a long key G(X) obtained by privacy amplification. In
the case of quantum knowledge, however, it is possible to prove even stronger
statements for the single-bit case, resulting in a strengthened version of
Corollary 13, which gives a bound on a quantity similar to d(H(X)|WS ;H)
. Using this and Footnote 12, the constant 3
4
in Corollary 19 can be replaced
by 1
2
.
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expression for the amount of key that can be generated by the
protocol. In particular, it proves that the security holds against
any type of attack (including coherent measurements on Eve’s
whole quantum system).
VI. CONCLUSIONS AND OPEN PROBLEMS
It is a fundamental question whether s quantum bits are
more powerful than s classical bits in order to store infor-
mation about an n-bit value X (for n > s). We considered
the problem of answering a randomly chosen question F about
X , given only the stored information about X . The uncertainty
about the answer F (X) is then a measure for the usefulness
of the stored information. It can be quantified in terms of
the distance of F (X) from uniform conditioned on the stored
information, which, for binary questions F , corresponds to the
advantage over 1/2 of the success probability when guessing
F (X). It turns out that when storing a bitstring X of length
n = 2 bits, one quantum bit can indeed be more useful than
one classical bit (cf. Lemma 14). However, for larger values of
n− s, the difference between classical and quantum memory
becomes inessential.14
We have shown that this has interesting implications for
cryptography. In particular, privacy amplification by two-
universal hashing remains secure even against adversaries
holding quantum information (cf. Corollary 19). This also
leads to conceptually simpler and more general security proofs
for quantum key distribution, where privacy amplification is
used for the classical post-processing of the raw key (cf. [10],
[13]).
It is well-known that so-called strong extractors [9] can be
used to do privacy amplification in the classical case. While
two-universal hashing can be seen as special case of this,
the converse generally does not hold. It is an open problem
whether strong extractors are sufficient to generate a key which
is secure against a quantum adversary in general.
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APPENDIX
Lemma 20 (Schur’s inequality): Let A be a linear operator
on a d-dimensional Hilbert space Hd and let {µi}di=1 be its
eigenvalues. Then
d∑
i=1
|µi|2 ≤ tr(AA†) ,
with equality if and only if A is normal (i.e., AA† = A†A).
Proof: See, e.g., [23].
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Lemma 21: Let A be a normal operator on a d-dimensional
Hilbert space Hd. Then
|tr(A)|2 ≤ d · tr(AA†) .
Proof: Since A is normal, we have
tr(A) =
d∑
i=1
µi and tr(AA†) =
d∑
i=1
|µi|2 ,
where {µi}di=1 are the eigenvalues of A. The assertion then
follows from Jensen’s inequality stating that
∣∣∣ d∑
i=1
µi
∣∣∣2 ≤ d · d∑
i=1
|µi|2 .
Lemma 22: Let a, b ∈ N. Then the following equalities
hold:
2a∑
z=0
(
2a
z
)
· ∣∣1
2
− z
2a
∣∣ = 1
2
(
2a
a
)
(14)
min(a,b)∑
z=0
z
(a+ z)! (a− z)! (b+ z)! (b− z)! =
ab
2(a+ b) (a!)2 (b!)2
(15)
min(a,b)∑
z=0
z + 12
(a+ z + 1)! (a− z)! (b+ z + 1)! (b− z)!
=
1
2(a+ b+ 1) (a!)2 (b!)2
.
(16)
Proof: The first equality follows from a straightforward
calculation, using the identity
(
a
z
) · za = (a−1z−1). The second
and the third equality can be obtained with Zeilberger’s algo-
rithm [24] which is implemented in many standard computer
algebra systems (e.g., Mathematica or Maple).
Lemma 23 (Stirling’s approximation): For n ∈ N,
√
2pinn+
1
2 e−n+
1
12n+1 < n! <
√
2pinn+
1
2 e−n+
1
12n .
Proof: A proof of this extension of Stirling’s approxi-
mation can be found in [25].
